Clinical review: Mass casualty triage – pandemic influenza and critical care by Challen, Kirsty et al.
Page 1 of 6
(page number not for citation purposes)
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/11/2/212
Abstract
Worst case scenarios for pandemic influenza planning in the US
involve over 700,000 patients requiring mechanical ventilation. UK
planning predicts a 231% occupancy of current level 3 (intensive
care unit) bed capacity. Critical care planners need to recognise
that mortality is likely to be high and the risk to healthcare workers
significant. Contingency planning should, therefore, be multi-
faceted, involving a robust health command structure, the facility to
expand critical care provision in terms of space, equipment and
staff and cohorting of affected patients in the early stages. It
should also be recognised that despite this expansion of critical
care, demand will exceed supply and a process for triage needs to
be developed that is valid, reproducible, transparent and
consistent with distributive justice. We advocate the development
and validation of physiological scores for use as a triage tool,
coupled with candid public discussion of the process.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that conditions exist for the evolution of
a new strain of influenza virus with the potential to cause a
human pandemic [1]. The biggest challenge in planning for
an influenza pandemic is the range of unknown factors; its
nature and impact cannot be fully predicted until the
pandemic virus actually emerges. Those planning for a
pandemic must, therefore, work from a number of
assumptions based on knowledge gained from previous
pandemics and scientific modelling of a range of potential
scenarios. The UK Pandemic Influenza Plan [2] sets out a
range of possible scenarios for clinical attack rates and case
fatality rates during a pandemic, including the potential for
more than one wave. The base scenario assumes a clinical
attack rate of 25% and a case fatality rate of 0.37%, giving
rise to 53,700 excess deaths in the UK. A reasonable worst
case scenario involves a cumulative clinical attack rate of
50% with 2.5% case fatality, causing 709,300 excess
deaths. Similarly, the US Department of Health and Human
Services predicts that in a “moderate” scenario based on a
virus with 1968-like pathogenicity, 865,000 will require
hospitalisation and 65,000 (7.5%) will require ventilation.
They also outline a “severe” 1918-like scenario with 9.9
million hospitalisations and 743,000 patients requiring
ventilation [3].
An influenza pandemic will undoubtedly create a major
increase in demand for critical care services. The majority of
UK hospital intensive care units (ICUs) are already operating
at >98% bed occupancy. Integral to the success of any
emergency planning strategy is ‘surge capability’,
incorporating the ability to scale up the delivery of appropriate
specialist care to those that require it [4]. Modelling of the
impact of an influenza pandemic on UK critical care services
has been carried out using the FluSurge 1.0 programme
developed at the US Centers for Disease Control [5]. With
simulation of an 8-week epidemic and 25% attack rate the
demand for critical care beds from patients with influenza
would represent 208% of current combined level 2 (high-
dependency unit) and level 3 (ICU) bed capacity, and 231%
of current level 3 capacity [6]. Even allowing for optimistic
estimates of other modulating factors (50% reduction in ICU
demand with use of neuraminidase inhibitors and 50%
upgrade of level 2 to level 3 beds), level 3 bed occupancy
due to the pandemic would remain at 75%. Furthermore,
occupancy of level 3 beds by ‘flu patients’ was unsustainable
at approximately 50% in terms of care for other patients even
in the most optimistic conditions.
Although some research and modelling exists regarding
hospital surge capacity for major incidents, this generally
relates to ‘big bang’ single incidents rather than ‘rising tide’
prolonged problems [7-11]. The closest objective evidence
for efficacy of critical care in the event of a flu pandemic is
extrapolated from H5N1 influenza and the recent SARS
outbreak in Toronto. Of the H5N1 admissions to hospital in
Thailand, 75% developed respiratory failure. Hospital
mortality in these cases was 75% [12]. During the Toronto
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SARS outbreak, up to 32% of cases were admitted to ICU,
25% were mechanically ventilated and 28 day mortality for
ventilated patients was 45% [13]. In Singaporean SARS
patients admitted to ICU, 98% developed ARDS [13].
Properly constructed plans for the delivery of critical care
during an influenza pandemic must include the ability to deal
with excessive demand, high and possibly extreme mortality,
and the risk to the health of critical care staff.
Incident management and surge capacity
The consequences of a pandemic, both in terms of numbers
of patients and the effect on the healthcare system, are likely
to precipitate a ‘major incident’ where special arrangements
are needed to manage the system while it is under extreme
pressure. It is anticipated that there will be an overwhelming
demand for critical care services, not only for respiratory
support through mechanical ventilation but also for a full
range of care to manage multi-organ failure. Assuming that
the next pandemic derives from the H5N1 strain, the
epidemiological evidence to date suggests extremely high
mortality and, although not precisely quantifiable, a significant
risk to health care workers. Both of these will undermine the
ability to deliver critical care to influenza patients even before
consideration is given to the duty of care to other critically ill
patients.
Coherent incident response requires a robust command and
control structure, with the ability to make rapid informed
decisions across an organisation and also across a health
economy. In the UK, health incident management is based on
a ‘medallion’ structure, with gold, silver and bronze corres-
ponding to strategic, tactical and operational command levels
[14]. North American and Asian health institutions tend to use
the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System [15]. The
common theme in both systems is a clear command and
control structure with which healthcare staff should be
familiar [4,14,16-19]. Their generic hierarchical structure
allows application to a wide range of incidents whilst
retaining familiarity gained from training and exercises. The
importance of familiarity with the command and control
structure was highlighted in a recent Delphi study [20] and
European survey [21].
Critical care contingency planning guidance from the UK
Department of Health places an expectation on providers to
expand their level 3 bed capacity by a factor of 3 but no
more. Provision of full multiorgan level 3 support is
recognised to be unrealistic, but principally respiratory
support is felt to be achievable. Cancellation of elective
surgery to minimise alternative sources of demand for critical
care, upgrading level 2 to level 3 facilities and recruitment of
theatre recovery areas and even operating theatres may allow
expansion of ICU-like care capacity. Staff in these areas
already have the competencies to manage sedated patients
and those receiving respiratory support. Escalating their
clinical role should require relatively limited focussed training
[22]. Other staff may need to be redeployed and receive
training in the management of critical care patients to support
fully trained staff, permitting a dilution of the standard critical
care nurse to patient ratio [23]. Flexibility around dependency
level and staff experience will be required [24]. The expansion
of ICU capacity to provide critical care in other areas will
require the pre-emptive identification, tracing and
maintenance of all usable equipment and potentially the
stockpiling of key items to allow for rapid up-scaling of activity
in response to demand.
It is likely that there will be some variability in the prevalence
of influenza across the country during a pandemic wave, with
peaks in demand staggered across geographical areas. It
may be possible to disperse some of the patient load by inter-
facility transfer if this occurs to any significant extent.
The expansion of ICU facilities during the SARS epidemic in
Hong Kong and Singapore was recently described [25].
Infection control is recognised as an overriding priority for the
delivery of critical care, including the ability, in the early
stages, to cohort cases. This should ideally include the use of
separate entrances and exits, isolation rooms with negative
pressure ventilation and dedicated separate healthcare staff.
The Toronto experience identified 21 secondary cases of
nosocomial transmission of SARS in ICU from an initial index
case before infection control measures were introduced.
Even following the introduction of extensive protective
equipment, nine healthcare workers developed SARS as a
result of being present in the room during the intubation of a
single patient. In terms of personal protection, planning and
practice in the donning of protective equipment (PPE) and
prior fit testing is essential [26]. The practicalities of being
able to manage patients when fully attired must be
understood and consideration given to the fact that any
procedure or task will take longer. This will impact on care
efficiency and the staff to patient ratio.
While beds can be scaled up and extra areas recruited to
provide critical care, without trained staff the planning will be
ineffective. Staff illness rates and the risk to staff must be
factored into the planning process. In the UK, staff illness has
been estimated at 30% with work absences of up to 8 days
[2]. Normal working patterns may need to be revised and
facilities provided for staff to stay on site rather than go home
to their families. Staff absence tends to be greater the longer
special circumstances apply and the greater the impact on the
lives of the staff [27]. The preventive effectiveness of neura-
minidase inhibitors may make focussed chemoprophylaxis a
strategy for reducing staff illness in critical care areas [28].
Triage
The evolution of a new pandemic strain of influenza will
inevitably result in a major increase in demand for critical care
services. It is likely that these services will rapidly reach theirPage 3 of 6
(page number not for citation purposes)
capacity and even their contingency arrangements for
extended facilities will be overwhelmed. Excessive demand
where resources are finite creates an ethical dilemma and
many emergency plans apply a utilitarian approach of ‘best
care for the greatest number’ [29]. There is a legitimate
debate about how limited capacity can best be utilised, but a
number of themes are recurrent. There needs to be a legal
and ethical framework for the process decided in advance,
the rationale for triage should be fair and transparent and it
should meet the principles of distributive justice [30-32].
Triage can conflict with human rights legislation and even
humanitarian laws but ‘accountability for reasonableness’ can
temper the disagreements about priority setting [33].
The decision making process needs to be valid and
reproducible. Although there are a number of triage systems
available for mass casualty incidents, there has been little
validation of any of them in the field [34], and what there has
been relates to ‘big bang’ single incidents and the apparent
unreliability of triage [35,36]. While it does not need to be
explicit ahead of time, the decision thresholds should be
based on both the cumulative evidence about the disease
process and prognosis, and the number of patients and
severity of illness making the demands on the service [31]. In
effect, triage may result in a gradual degradation of care with
the increasing scale of the incident and become a ‘societally
mandated Do Not Resuscitate order’. On these grounds the
process needs to be carefully considered at an appropriately
senior level and applied consistently [32].
Allowing for the utilitarian approach, it is recognised that in
mass casualty incidents, the standard of care for all patients,
including those not immediately related to the incident, may
need to be adjusted and reduced. While this may infringe
individual rights, the higher ethical principle of ‘wellness of
society as a whole’ allows for the direction of resources to
those where it is felt most effective. It may also allow for an
expansion in the scope of practice of non-physicians [37].
It may be unrealistic and impractical to expect that senior
medical intensive care staff will make all decisions regarding
instituting critical care and there will be a need to empower
more referring general clinicians to do so. This is at odds with
the need for decision making by the most senior person [32]
and will require a change in practice for many clinicians; it is
not current practice in the UK. The use of track and triage
protocols will be essential to direct this decision making and
ensure its consistency. Ardagh [38] has developed a set of
pragmatic questions for the clinician facing acute problems of
resource allocation; the only point lacking in his assessment
process is a tool for the ‘ranking’ of patients in terms of
likelihood of benefit from the limited resources.
We believe that the basic criteria for a system for triage to
critical care in a pandemic are fourfold; it should identify
patients sick enough to require higher level care at some
stage in their illness, it should be able to recognise those
patients who are too acutely or chronically unwell to benefit
from critical care, it should be consistently applicable by
healthcare professionals and support workers from a variety
of backgrounds within the constraints of the pandemic and
should ideally also be scalable to reflect any mismatch
between need and capacity. In order to fairly allocate
resources across both flu and non-flu patients it should also
be disease non-specific and allow prognostic comparisons
across disease categories.
A number of scoring systems have been advocated for use in
a pandemic. The UK Department of Health currently recom-
mends a six-point pneumonia severity score [2]. Although US
guidelines emphasise the importance of triage in primary
influenza, specific tools are only recommended for assess-
ment of post-influenza bacterial pneumonia [39].
The majority of available potential scores were developed as
mortality indicators and perform less well for predicting
critical care usage. Amongst ICU admissions with
community-acquired pneumonia in Massachusetts in 1996 to
1997, 10/32 scored CURB-65 1 or 2 (that is, low risk) and
5/32 were classified as PSI (Pneumonia Severity Index) class
III (intermediate risk) [40]. Even amongst patients with
pneumonia included in the PROWESS study, only 90.5%
were PSI class IV or V, and only 70.3% had a CURB-65
score of 3 or above [41].
There is no guarantee that pandemic influenza will be
primarily pneumonic in its presentation; case reports have
documented H5N1 influenza presenting with diarrhoea
[42,43] and coma [43] and a World Health Organisation
summary has described absence of respiratory symptoms in
a number of cases [44]. The utility of disease-specific
pneumonia scores may also be limited by mortality from
comorbidities such as cardiovascular disease.
A number of intensive care scoring systems have demon-
strated their power in using physiological derangement to
predict mortality or higher resource requirements, whatever
the presenting diagnosis [45-49]. Physiological scores have
also been demonstrated to be good predictors of require-
ment for higher level care on hospital wards [50], in medical
assessment units [51,52] and in the Emergency Department
[53]. We have demonstrated that a purely clinical score
incorporating acute physiological derangement and chronic
health and performance status can reliably predict require-
ment for critical care [54].
It is inevitable that if an influenza pandemic reaches the scale
of some predictions, some patients who, in normal
circumstances, would benefit from critical care will not be
offered it. Critical care triage will need to evolve from a
process of identifying cases who need high level care to one
that determines those patients most likely to benefit from the
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/11/2/212limited resources available and distinguishes them from those
where care is likely to be futile.
This is recognised by the Emergency Medicine community
and the US administration in terms of disaster triage [37,55].
The American Thoracic Society adopted the utilitarian
principle a decade ago, stating that “the duty of health
providers to benefit an individual patient has limits when
doing so unfairly compromises the availability of resources
needed by others” [56]. The problem now facing policy-
makers and clinicians is defining a process for resource
allocation that meets the requirements of distributive justice
and accountability for reasonableness [33]. As the Working
Group on Emergency Mass Critical Care of the Society for
Critical Care Medicine recognised, “an ideal triage system is
based on data collected at hospital admission, requires little
or no laboratory testing, and has been proven to predict
hospital survival” [57].
The Ontario Ministry of Health Long-term Care working group
have courageously taken the first steps in defining a triage
protocol for critical care [58] and their use of serial
Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) scores to
place a ceiling on care provided to non-responding patients
is to be supported. However, it is unlikely to be feasible for all
patients to have a trial of inotropes and/or ventilation and
some way of screening out the sicker patients at ward/floor
level will be required.
We are not aware of the use of objective prognostic scores to
allocate or refuse critical care resources at present and indeed
most research demonstrates the ad hoc nature of admission
decision-making [59]. However, if, as is likely, review by
experienced critical care physicians is impractical, decision
support will be required for the non-critical care specialist.
Emergency physicians, for example, had a positive predictive
value (PPV) of only 73% in identifying those with a low chance
of survival, as opposed to critical care fellows (PPV 83%) and
the Mortality Probability Model (MPM0; PPV 86%) [60].
SOFA scoring has previously been demonstrated on a
multinational basis to predict high risk of mortality (a SOFA
score of over 15 was 98.9% specific for mortality) [61].
Other critical care scoring systems show comparable perfor-
mance in mortality prediction; discrimination as measured by
area under Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve
was 0.825 to 0.901 for Acute Physiology and Chronic Health
Evaluation III (APACHE III) [62-65], 0.79 to 0.846 for
Simplified Acute Physiology Score II (SAPS II) [62,64,66],
and 0.928 for the Multiple Organ Dysfunction Score [67].
However, calibration of these scores to give absolute risks of
mortality has not always been reliable [65] and has required
customisation for international use [68,69].
Concentrated work is clearly required to amend and validate
existing scoring systems so that they are suitable for use as
triage tools. We suggest that this should be done on two
levels. While disease specific scoring systems are valuable
and should continue to be refined, there is a need to develop
an appropriately generalisable scoring system for as
unselected a group of patients as possible. To have the
discriminating power, it will need to take place on a multi-
centre or, preferably, on a multi-national basis.
Conclusion
It is a general principle of major incident planning that
procedures should not be changed at precisely the moment
when the system or institution is under its greatest stress, so
planning for pandemic flu needs to make use as much as
possible of systems and procedures already in place.
Development of a triage system and tool needs to be
accompanied by planning for hospital command and control
(to dictate scalability as related to available resources) and by
training for staff whose roles may change.
Researchers, clinicians and policymakers in the field need to
analyse systems and scores already in existence and improve
and validate them as triage tools (though this may not be the
purpose for which they were originally developed). At the
same time ethical principles require transparency and
consistency in the decision-making process, and involvement
of public in its development.
In reality, perhaps the question we need to address is the
action required when critical care services are overwhelmed.
The scalability of triage tools may aid in decision making by
objectively altering the threshold for admission to critical care.
However, the time may come when we need realistically to
evaluate the effectiveness of critical care in influenza. If
survival with the benefit of critical care is marginal (for
example, <10%) and there is a significant cross-infection risk,
perhaps critical care should then close and concentrate its
efforts on outreach to other areas, including wards. Direction
and support from professional bodies and health
departments will be required to support the medical staff with
such difficult decisions possibly against a ground swell of
media-driven public opinion.
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